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1. Introduction 
. . 
An experiment compares a new procedure with a control on the basis of k 
variables. The results suggest that new is better than control for some 
variables but not for others. Statistical hypothesis tests find that new is 
"significantly better" (a a .05) for two of the variables. 
Classical analysis does not stop here. Suppose new and control are actually 
identical insofar as these k variables are concerned; this is the intersection 
of the k·individual null hypotheses. Then one expects new to be statistically 
significantly better for SJ of the variables. For example, if k Q 40 then 
observing two significant results is actually expected when.all 40 null 
hypotheses are true. 
~Suppose that the k variables x1, ••• , Xk are differences~ new minus 
control, standardized to have unit variance. Suppose further, that each Xi is 
normally· distributed with mean µi and that the x1•s are independent given the 
µ1•s. The 1th null hypothesis is µi • o. The intersection or all k null 
hypotheses is H0: µ1 • ••• a µk • O. The null probability of Xi> 1.645 is .05 
-1 
since t (.95) = 1.645, the 95th percentile of the standard normal. But the 
k 
null probability that at least one x1 > 1.645 is 1-.95. This obviously 
increases rapidly; fork= 40 it is about .87. So the null probability of at 
least one rejection can be much larger than the "nominal level" .OS. Classical 
statistical wisdom dictates an adjustment. One way to make the "actual level" 
equal to .05 is to increase the rejection limits for each Xi from 1.645 
-1 1 /k 1 / 40 -, tot (.95 ). For example, .95 ~ .9987 and t (.9987) = 3.00. So to 
attain significance for the 1th variable at the .05 level requires 
xi> 3.00. 
This seems ludlcrous from a scientific point of view: How can the mere fact 
that bilirubin levels were measured (not what they were, just that they were 
measured!) affect inferences about blood pressure? An investigator who carried 
out only one test might find a significant difference whereas the same 
difference would not have been significant had the investigator tested enough 
other variables. (There is a strong temptation to cheat-~cr. Berger and Berry 
(1987)~ . . ... Especially since such cheating is impossible to uncover--it depends on 
the intentions of the investigator rather than on the~. which are 
unadulterated. And. it would be regarded as cheating at most by those few 
scientists who understand this statistical construction.) 
Such classical statistical adjustments also seem inconsistent with a 
Bayesian point of view; the mere fact that variables were measured is irrelevant 
to the current distribution of the µi's~ Of course, the actual observations (or 
partial information about these observations) can change the current 
distribution. The new distribution is a function of those observations and so 
is random--its average being the current distribution. 
Still, this issue is not clearcut. For example, when observing a large 
number of exchangeable random variables, some will be larger than others. 
Selecting those that are extreme can be misleading. In both this example and 
the previous setting, the infinitely careful Bayesian need not worry, but the 
Bayesian who assumes a prior distribution without careful reflection may obtain 
a posterior distribution that is far from what it should be. While this 
statement is true generally, the issue is more critical when making multiple 
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inferences than when making inferences in a univariate setting. 
Adjustments for simultaneously testing many null hypotheses are similar to 
those that arise in many guises in classical statistics. Historically the most 
important of these has been the problem of "multiple comparisons," in which many 
treatments (and their interactions) are compared on the basis of measuring some 
variable for each treatment (see Section 3). Another is applying several 
different statistical tests of the same hypothesis to the same data (t-tes~, 
signed~rank test, etc.). An area which has recently been the focus of much 
research is "interim analysis," in which tests of an hypothesis are carried out 
periodically as data accumulate. 
The Bayesian approach to interim analysis is straightforward (Berry 1985, 
1987) and uncomplicated by some of the considerations of multiple 
comparisons and testing many variables (see Section 4). The distinction is that 
in the problem of interim analysis (and also that of several different tests for 
the same hypothesis) the hypothesis being tested involves a one-dimensional 
parameter (e.g., µ1 °Oas opposed to µ1 = ••• = µk =O). This might seem like a 
trivial distinction--one simply applies Bayes's theorem in both cases. But, 
much greater care seems necessary in assessing prior information when the null 
hypothesis is more complicated. 
Still another area of some concern to classical statistics is variable 
selection in regression. Letting the data indicate which of many variables to 
use in regression can greatly exaggerate the appropriateness or such a data-
indicated model from a classical statistical point of view. However, there 
would be no objection to the~ model if the variables had been selected in 
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advance, or separate from the data! Suppose a researcher uses a linear model 
involving a number of independent variables. If the researcher chose the 
variables in advance then the results are believable; otherwise, they are not. 
If you cannot tell which of the two from a report of the study, then (as I have 
heard classical statisticians advise) you have to write to the researcher to 
find out which! (What to do if the researcher has since died? Randomize?) It 
is hard for me to understand how classical statisticians can continue to adhere 
to a philosophy that takes them down so many roads that lead to nonsense. 
A more general question of great importance to statistics and all of science 
is whether and how it is possible to learn from data. Sounds silly! 
Statistics.!!_ learning from data. But classical statistics qualifies this 
statement. A fundamental tenet of classical statistics is that one cannot test 
a hypothesis using-the same data that generated the hypothesis. If one notices 
a tendency through "data dredging" then one must get another data set to verify 
that the tendency is real. The problem, classical statisticians say, is that 
there are so many tendencies that could be dredged up, noticing one tendency is 
not very surprising. 
A Bayesian can calculate the posterior probability that any given tendency 
is real, but requires a prior probability. It seems impossible to, in advance 
or an experiment, assess one's prior probability for each tendency that might 
arise. But is it possible to assess one's prior probability after seeing the 
data? I think it is possible, but it is very difficult. Obviously, it is wrong 
to incorporate the same data into a posterior probability twice. So one must be 
able to say with some confidence, "This is what I thought before." 
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Alternatively, one can simply assess one's current probability after having 
seen the data, eschewing the use of Bayes's theorem and relying instead on one's 
internal analogue. We do this all the time. Our internal Bayes's theorem may 
not process information as well as does the real thing, and some of us may 
process it incredibly badly, but we are not likely to-use the data twice. To 
check an assessor's ability in this regard, apply Bayes's theorem in reverse, 
dividing the posterior by the likelihood to yield the prior. This may not be 
possible and, if possible, when there are zeroes in the likelihood the result is 
not uniquely defined. If it is not possible then the assessor can be instructed 
on removing this inconsistency. In any case, it is appropriate to adjust the 
posterior if the assessor "never could have had that prior." 
Still a third possibility is to find people who haven't seen the data and 
have them serve as surrogate assessors. This procedure can serve to educate the 
assessor, and can be combined with the other two procedures. 
In the next section I discuss the possibility of, and 11fficulties 
associated with, making Bayesian inferences concerning hypotheses generated by 
the data. In Section 3 I define multiple comparisons and multiple tests. 
Section 4 draws a parallel with the so-called empirical Bayes problem and 
suggests this as a way to view some problems in multiple inference. 
My goal throughout is not to give results which are immediately useful to 
the practitioner, but only to elucidate the major issues. So the examples and 
settings I use are rather simple. 
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2. Data Dredging; Simultaneous Learning and Testing 
Consider this scenario. A large study was conducted by randomly selecting 
30-year-old men and following them for a long period of time. The investigators 
measured hundreds of variables at five-year intervals, with no particular plan 
for testing them all. Some conclusions are boringly predictable: men who were 
overweight tended to die at an earlier age and were generally less healthy; 
similarly for men who smoked cigarettes. But there's something new and quite 
unexpected: men who chewed gum regularly lived six years longer on average than 
men who never chewed gum! This difference is "highly statistically 
significant": nominal P-value < .01. Moreover, this difference persists upon 
adjusting for all available covariates. 
As I have indicated, classical statisticians would consider the number of 
tests that had been carried out and suitably adjust the P-value upwards, for 
example, using Bonferroni's inequality. In particular, if the number of tests 
is sufficiently large, the result will no longer be significant. And if this 
number is not available then a good classical statistician would say that 
correct inferences regarding this issue require another study. 
What about the Bayesia~ point of view? Figure 1 shows the likelihood 
function forµ, the mean increm~nt in length of life (in years) as a result of 
chewing gum. 2 This is reasonably approximated by N(6, 2 ). In particular, the 
likelihood ratio ofµ= 6 (obviously the extreme case) compared withµ= O is 
about 89. 
My prior distribution on u (which I can assess unencumbered by knowing the 
data because I also know that the data are fake!) is approximately 
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Figure 1~ Likelihood ofµ. 
. 2 
.600 + .4N(-.1, 1.2 )--the probability ofµ= 0 is .6 and the rest of my 
probability is dispersed rather near o. So I'm not convinced that chewing gum 
has no effect but I doubt that it has much. {The negative mean, E(µ) D -.04 
years, reflects my pessimism regarding the healthfulness of a regular intake of 
sugar. This pessimism is partially balanced by the possibility that the 
miniscule amount of exercise one gets while chewing gum might be beneficial!) 
To be somewhat more general, suppose that the prior distribution of~ is 
( 1) 
Then the posterior distribution when the likelihood is N(6, 22) is 
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where 
2 2 2 
a1 = 4a0 /(4 + a0 ), 
and p' is defined by the posterior odds ratio: 
p' p 
--=--
1-p' , .. p a1 exp 
The mean of this distribution is E(µldata) = (1-p')µ 1• 
Substituting a0 = 1.2, µ0 = -.1, and p = .6 gives 
2 (µ!data) - .3100 + .63N(1.51, 1.03 ), 
(2) 
which has mean E(µjdata) = .95 years. So the data has little effect on my 
rather strongly held opinion that chewing gum cannot increase one's life 
expectancy by anything like six years. 
I will consider two alternative prior distributions. The first Bayesian is 
rather cavalier, and the second's prior has been affected by the data. These 
types of behavior are never good, but I want to show how bad they can be in the 
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current setting. Though both priors are rather extreme to best make my point~ I 
have kept the prior probability ofµ• 0 at pa ~6 to facilitate comparison~ 
The Bayesian who goes overboard in being open-minded might choose 
p = .6, µ0 a O, and a0
2 
a 102 in (1 ). Substituting these into (2) gives 
2 (µJdata) - .09o O + .91N(5.77, 1.96 ), 
which has mean E(µfdata) • 5.2 years. Obviously, the data haye substantially 
changed this prior. (Incidentally~ the Bayesian who assumes a0
2 
~min (1) is 
actually being dogmatic rather than open~minded. For, p' ~ 1 for any µ0 and 
p > O; and so the distribution or (µfdata) ~ oO! Also, or course, the 
2 . 
distribution or (µ(data)~ oO_as aO --,. O, though the functional relation 
above gives p' ~ p. (Neither of these results depends on the data.) Between 
these two extremes, p' has a minimum value which for these data and µ0 = O 
occurs at aO
2 ~ 5.72; the minimum value of p' when p = .6 is .076, which is 
2 2 
rather close top' a .09 corresponding to a0 = 10 .) 
It is not an easy matter to put Figure 1 out of one's mind having seen it, 
or to ever be convinced of having put it out of mind! The Bayesian who forms an 
opinion after looking at the data and then updates via Bayes's theorem using~ 
~~is obviously acting unreasona~ly. As an extreme case, suppose p = .6 
and the prior mean and variance of (µ(µ¢0) are the maximum likehood estimates: 
2 2 µ0 n 6 and a0 = 2. Substituting these into (2) gives 
(ufdata) - .0200 +.98N(6, 2), 
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which has mean E(µldata) • 5.9 years. The prior weight of p • ~6 onµ• O has 
been essentially annihilated; such a Bayesian is pretty convinced thatµ is near 
6 years. The data have virtually the entire say when allowing one aspect of the 
prior to depend on the data. 
I hope this example convinces you first that it ll possible to test 
hypotheses using the data that generated them; and second that doing so is not 
without peril. 
3. Multiple Comparisons and Multiple Tests 
To set up some terminology and conventions for the next section, consider k 
populations with means µ1 , ••• , µk. Observations x1 , ••• , Xk are available on 
these populations such that EXi • µi. Given µ1 , ••• , µk the x1•s are 
independent. Let X(l) S ••• S X(k) be the ordered observations and u(i) = EX(i) 
(so µCi) is the mean of the population with the 1th smallest observation--the 
µ(i)'s may not be ordered). 
The following two problems involve multiple inferences: 
Multiole Comparisons: Based on x1, ••• , Xk, make inferences concerning the 
relationships among the various µi's. 
Multiple Tests: Based on x1 , ••• , Xk, make inferences concerning the various 
µ.'s individually. 
1 
An example of the first is testing the hypothesis that µ(l) = u( 2 ). An 
example of the second is testing the hypothesis that µCt)• o. 
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There are at least two types of multiple testing problems: 
(1) The populations are k different treatments and the x1 •s refer to the 
same measurement (blood pressure, e.g.), and 
(11) There is one treatment or experimental setting and the populations 
refer to k different measurements (blood pressure, heart rate, bilirubin levels, 
etc.). 
Obviously, in a multiple comparisons problem, only type (i) is appropriate: 
one would hardly be interested in the difference between mean blood pressure and 
mean heart rate. Some of the discussion so far in this article deals with (11) 
in the context of multiple tests. The next section focuses mainly on (1) in the 
context of multiple comparisons and multiple tests. 
4. An Empirical Bayes Connection 
Though the setup in this section is rather simple, the conclusions 
correspond rather closely with the way Bayesians should think about· comparisons 
and tests when there are multiple treatments. For example, to make inferences 
about µ( 1 ) one may need to know all the data, not just x, 1 ). Also µ(l) is 
typically positively correlated with X(i)' 1 = 1, ••• , k. 
Suppose that the treatment responses are 
Xi - N(µ 1, 1), 1 = 1, ••• , k. 
The µ.'s are unknown and so are themselves random variables, their joint 
l 
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distribution reflecting information about, and relationships among, the various 
treatment responses. 
While most of this section treats problems of type (1) defined in the 
previous section, I want to consider type (ii) problems briefly. Suppose the 
x1's are measurements on k different variables in the same experimental setting. 
It seems reasonable a priori to consider the possibility that theµ. are 
l 
independent. But one might also allow for the possibility that they are 
related. For example, a drug that decreases blood pressure is likely to affect 
. . (positively or negatively) heart rate, left ventricular ejection fraction, 
vascular resistance, etc. Such possibilities should be considered in multiple 
testing problems. It may be wrong to suppose independence but it would also be 
wrong to suppose that the µ1•s are positively correlated, say. 
If the µi's are independent a priori then t~ey will also be independent 
given x1, ••• , Xk. So in this case the posterior distribution of µi given 
x1, ••• , Xk is simply the posterior distribution of µ 1 given x1, and making 
inferences about µ1 is a one~dimensional problem. In particular, there is no 
multiple inference issue: the distribution of µ(i) depends on x1, ••• , Xk only 
through X(i). 
While it may be reasonable for someone to regard the means of k variables 
(type (ii)) as being independent, this seems less reasonable fork treatments 
(type(!)). Independence across treatments assumes very firm information about 
the treatments and the experimental setting. The careful probability assessor 
may well recognize that there is an underlying unknown effect which influences 
all observations similarly, irrespective of treatment. For example, consider a 
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clinical trial involving several treatments for breast cancer. This disease 
continues to be diagnosed earlier and earlier in its cycle. Thus every 
treatment should be more effective now than it ever was before, though how much 
more effective would not be clear in advance. This is certainly true of no 
treatment bepause a patient "treated" earlier will obviously live longer after 
such "treatment." In addition, the entrance criteria and the way these criteria 
are administered by clinicians vary from one trial to the next; the differences 
can seem minor but still show up in the results very dramatically~ Because 
individual trials tend to involve rather homogeneous populations, the various 
treatments used in the current trial may seem more like each other than a single 
treatment seems like itself in previous trials. (A consequence of these 
considerations is that there is no such thing as a "known" treatment, one whose 
effectiveness in an experiment can be predicted up to statistical error. Even 
if an experimenter is meticulous about ensuring that all aspects of the current 
trial duplicate those of a previous trial, time and its many covariates will be 
different.) 
There are many ways that the µi can be dependent. One suggested by the 
previous paragraph is that (µ 1, ••• , µk) is a random sample from some 
distribution G, which is itself unknown. This is precisely the setup assumed in 
the "empirical Bayes" problem proposed by Robbins (1956). Converting one's 
available information about G into a probability distribution gives rise to what 
Deely and Lindley (1981) call a "Bayes empirical Bayes" problem; see also (Berry 
and Christensen 1979). When I say empirical Bayes I mean Bayes empirical 
Bayes. The empirical Bayes objective is usually to estimate G or the various 
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µ 1• The adaptation here is to hypothesis tests concerning the µ 1• 
To keep things reasonably simple~ suppose treatment 1 has either has no 
effect (µ 1 = 0) or a known positive effect (µi = 1). Distribution G has 
parameter p, which is the probability that any particular treatment has no 
effect: 
Conditional on p, the µ1 are independent, and so they are exchangeable. (This 
assumption 1s clearly inappropriate in type (ii) problems.) The proportion p of 
~reatments with no effect is unknown, with a priori density uniform on (0,1): 
n{p) = 1, which then implies the initial distribution for G and for the µ1• In 
particular, the marginal distribution of µ1 1s 
µ _,..r +,..t 1 2 uo 2 u,. 
Consider x1 , the observed response to treatment 1. Its conditional 
distribution given pis 
( x1 j p) - pN ( 0, 1 ) + ( 1-p )N ( 1 , 1 ) ; 
unconditionally, 
1 1 x1 - 2 N (0, 1) + 2 N ( 1, 1). 
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The density of p on (0,1) given x1 is 
p + (1-p)exp[X1-112J 
= 2 ---------
+ exp[X1-112J 
If, for examp~e, x1 • 1/2, halfway between the two candidates for µ 1, then 
ff(plX1 m1/2) • ff(p), corresponding with the obvious fact that x1 = 1/2 is 
noninformative as regards µ1 • 0 vs~,• 1. Also, ~(pfX1) ~ 2p or 2(1-p) 
according as x1 ~ ~m or x1 ~ +m, equivalent to actually observing µ 1 = O and 
µ 1 = 1, respectively. 
Now consider the distribution of µ 1 given x1• The new probability of 
µ 1 = O is 
I J 1 2pdp P(µl=O x,) a O 1 + exp(X
1
-1/2) 
a decreasing function of x1• So we have 
<JJ, Ix,> - ------ oo + 
1 + exp(X1-112) 
Again, x1 = 1/2 leaves the prior unchanged. 
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1 a-------1 + exp(x1~112) ' 
exp(X1-1/2) 
<51 • 
1 + exp(X1-112) 
(3) 
{J 
Now consider responses x1 and x2 on treatments 1 and 2. We have 
and so 
It follows that 
As a consequence, 
cx1,x2 fp) - (pN(o, 1) + c1-p)NC1, 1>]
2 
2 
1r(pfx1,x2> a: II (p + c1.;p)exp(x1-112>]~ 1=1 
P(µ1µ2=0I x, ,X2) ~ 2 
P(µ 1111 0,µ 2=1 fx1 ,X2 ) a: exp(X2-1/2) 
P(µ 112 1 ,µ 2nolx1 ,x2 ) a: ex.p(X1-1I2) 
P(µ1=µ2:al 1x1 ,X2) a: 2•exp(X1•X2-1). 
This tends to 1 or O according ~s x1 ~-=or+=. And it tends to 
(4) 
2/[2 + exp(X1-1/2)] or 1/[1 + 2•exp(X1-1/2)] according as x2 ~-~or+=. 
These latter conclusions are the same as the conditional distribution of u1 
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given x1, having already conditioned on µ 2 (the conditional distribution of µ 1 
given µ2 being 
Compare (3) with (4). Obviously, they are equal if x2 • 1/2--there is no 
information about pin x2 a 1/2. When x2 is greater than 1/2 then (4) > (3): if 
treatment 2 gives a large response then it is more difficult to decide that 
treatment l's effect is small. For example, if x2 • 2 then .43 has to be 
subtracted from x1 to keep_ the same probability of µ 1 = o. On the other hand, 
if x2 • -2 then to k~ep the probability of µ1 - 0 the same requires that ~58 be 
added to x1• 
Consider the impact that this has on the question of multiple tests. A 
researcher reports that x, 1 ) = -1. If k • 1 then the probability of µ(l) a o 
from (3) is 1/(1 + exp(-3/2)) • .82. But if k • 2 then the probability of 
µ(l) • 0 from (4) is 
2 + exp(X( 2 )-1/2) PCJJc, ,aofxc, >=-1 ,x<2>> - ---------------------2 + exp(X(2 )-1/2) + exp(-3/2) + 2•exp(X( 2 )-2) 
This is shown in Table 1 with, for comparison, the Joint probabilities of µ(l) 
and µ( 2 ). So if X(l) is much less than x( 2 ) then the evidence in favor of 
µ(l) a O is not as strong as if X(l) and x( 2) were both small. 
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TABLE 1 
Joint distribution of (µ(1) ,µ(2)) given X(l) ::, -1 as a function of lc2) 
xc2> -1 0 .5 1 2 3 co 
p ( µ ( 1 ) = 0 I X ( 1 ) =--1 • X ( 2 ) ) .87 .84 .82 .79 • 74 .71 .69 
p ( µ ( 2 ) ::IO I X ( 1 ) =--:-1 • X ( 2 ) ) .87 • 72 .61 .48 .26 • 11 0 
________ ..__ 
- -- -- -- -------
P(µ(1)-µ(2)=0IX(1)•-1,X(2}) .79 .65 .55 .43 .23 .10 0 
P(µ(1}•0,µ(2}•fX(1)•~1,X(2)} .09 .20 .27 .36 .51 ~61 ~69 
P ( µ ( l ) a 1 , µ ( 2 ) a Q ( X ( l ) a-1 ~ X ( 2 ) ) .09 .01 .06 .05 .03 .01 0 
p ( µ ( 1 ) = µ ( 2 ) = 1 I X ( 1 ) --1 • X ( 2 ) ) .04 .09 .12 .16 .23 .27 .31 
-- ------- - --
--------------
E(µ<2>-µ<1>fxc1>·-1,x<2>> 0 .12 .21 .31 .49 .60 ,69 
ECµc2>lxc2>>-ECµc1>lxc,>=-1> 0 .20 .32 .44 .64 • 74 .82 
The joint probabilities of µ(l) and µ( 2 ) are especially relevant for the 
question of multiple comparisons. For example, the penultimate row of Table 
shows how much less µ(l) is expected to be than µ( 2 ) as a function of x( 2 ) when 
X(l) = -1. The last row of the table shows the corresponding difference 
ignoring the relationship between µ 1 and u2• These two rows are analogous 
respectively, to the classical statistician considering and not considering the 
multiple comparisons question. Obviously, ignoring the relationship exaggerates 
the difference between µ(l) and µ( 2 ). 
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C, 
The more general case of making inferences about the µ1's given 
x1, •••• Xk involves more complicated calculations, but no new ideas. For 
larger k any inference about µ 1 (or u(l)) depends less on x1 (or X(l )) and more 
on responses to the other treatments. For example, 
and 
P(µ,=OfX1• X2a._ •• •Xk~ -=) • _k __ k__,_(X--1/_2_)_ 
+ exp 1-_ 
So it is easier to conclude that µ 1 is small when the responses to the other 
treatments are small but it is difficult (though not impossible!) to conclude 
,that u1 is small when the other responses are large. In particular, given x1 
and x2 = ••• • Xk ~ + m, for the probability of µ1 =Oto be greater than 1/2 
requires x1 < 1/2 ~ log k. 
An empirical Bayes approach which is quite promising for the multiple 
comparisons problem uses mixtures of Dirichlet processes (Antoniak 1974, Berry 
and Christensen 1979). In this approach, estimating G and the various ui 
requires finding the posterior probabilities of all possible combinations of 
equality and inequality among the u1 ~ For example, when k = 3 there are five 
possibilities: u1 - µ2 • µ3 - µ1, µ1 = u2 - u3, u1 = u3 • µ 2 , u1 • u2 = u3, and 
µ 1 = u2 = u3• One then calculates P(µ 1 = u2 1x1 ,x2 ,x3), say, by adding the 
second and fifth of these. A less than attractive aspect of using mixtures of 
Dirichlet processes is that the number of terms in the mixture increases very 
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fast as a function of k (Berry and Christensen 1979). 
The empirical Bayes approach in settings of multiple comparisions and 
multiple tests gives results which incline toward the classical statistical 
view. For example, x( 1} and x(2 ) can be further apart than would be expected by 
the naive analyst and still be consistent with the null hypothesis 
µ( 1) = µ( 2). And a researcher cannot simply report X(l) as an estimate of µ(l) 
or as a statistic for tests concerning µ(l); the rest of the data 
(X( 2)' ••• , X(k)) also contain~ relevant information~ But while classical 
"adjustments" depend only on k, empirical Bayes adjustments depend on the actual 
data. In analogy with classical adjustments, there would also be a Bayesian 
adjustment to inferences concerning µ( 1) if for some reason the Bayesian does 
not know all the data but only knows X(l) and k. I have not addressed this 
problem here. 
5. Conclusions 
From a Bayesian point of view it is possible to dredge data to generate 
hypotheses and then to test these hypotheses using the same data. However, the 
path to such inferences is perilous. 
Correcting for comparisons and tests involving multiple treatments, so 
widely espoused by classical statisticians, has an analogue in Bayesian 
statistics. Namely, one assumes that the treatments are themselves sampled from 
an unknown distribution, as in the empirical Bayes problem. When the k 
treatments have means µi that are exchangeable a priori, the following rough 
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interpretation is consistent with the empirical Bayes approach, and it seems 
reasonable in the problem at hand. The posterior distribution of µ1 is pulled 
toward treatment i response X., but also in the directions of the responses to l 
the other treatments. For any pair of treatments (i,j), the estimated 
distance between µi and µj given x1 , ••• , Xk is less than that between Xi and 
Xj, but the signs of the two differences are the same. In particular, if 
x1 a Xj then µi and µj are exchangeable a posteriori as well as a priori. 
The empirical Bayes approach is more relevant for simultaneous inferences 
concerning many treatments, problem (1) of Section 3, than concerning many 
variables (same "treatment"), problem (ii) of Section 3. Regarding the latter, 
I do not see that an adjustment along the lines of Section 4 would ever be 
appropriate because the µ 1•s cannot be exchangeable a priori. An appropriate 
analysis must take into account one's prior information concerning the 
relationships among the variables. 
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